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Our commentary focuses on the sense of experiential ownership and its implica-
tions for the Immunity Principle. In general we think that Liang elaborates the
self-as-object and the self-as-subject in an interesting and refreshing way. Never-
theless, there are some problems that we want to address. (1) First, we argue that
the sense of experiential ownership cannot misrepresent the fact of experiential
ownership. (2) Second, we argue that neither the sense of experiential ownership
in particular nor phenomenal states in general are eligible for identity judgments.
(3) Then we claim that the two alleged counterexamples actually do not provide
any valid argument against IEM. (4) We close by evaluating whether it makes
sense to talk about the Immunity Principle as a non-trivial property, or whether
the relevant properties are just mispredication or misguided reference. 
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1 Introduction: Preliminaries and 
conceptual clarification
Liang investigates some interesting issues con-
cerning  self-consciousness  and  its  relation  to
conscious  phenomenology  and  bodily  self-con-
sciousness.  His  argumentation,  which  has  the
aim of being interdisciplinary fruitful, is closely
tied  to  some  conceptual  distinctions  that  are
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also very important for our commentary. First,
he  refines  the  initial  point  of  the  Wittgen-
steinean distinction between self-as-object  and
self-as-subject (Wittgenstein 1958). An import-
ant  distinction  concerning  the  former  is  the
sense of body ownership and the sense of self as
physical body, which describes the self-as-object
in a more fine-grained manner. The self as sub-
ject is also sub-classified in terms of the fact of
experiential ownership and the sense of experi-
ential ownership. The sense of experiential own-
ership describes mental states that refine pro-
prietarily aspects of  who is having the experi-
ence in question. Liang claims that the sense of
experiential ownership is is not privileged in the
sense that it gives rise to the well-known prop-
erty  immunity  to  error  through  misidentifica-
tion (IEM). In the second part of his investiga-
tion he is concerned with theoretical and empir-
ical investigations made by Damasio, Panksepp
and Northoff, which do not provide substantial
evidence in their measurements for the sense of
self as experiential subject. They rather concern
the self-as-object  and therefore  disregard  sub-
stantial aspects of self-consciousness. Our com-
mentary will focus on the sense of experiential
ownership with regard to IEM. According to Li-
ang, there are several counterexamples to IEM,
mainly to be found in misrepresentations (like
in the body-swap illusion) due to a sense of ex-
periential  ownership.  In  this  commentary,  we
ask  ourselves  the  following  questions:  is  the
sense of experiential ownership a plausible can-
didate  for  exemplifying  the  property  of  IEM,
and could there be serious counterexamples to
that  principle?  We  defend  the  following  four
theses: 
(1)  The  sense  of  experiential  ownership
cannot misrepresent the fact of experien-
tial ownership (cf. section 3).
(2) Phenomenal states like the sense of self
as  experiential  subject  are  ineligible  to
serve as bearers of IEM as a property (cf.
section 3).
(3)  Liang’s  counterexamples  do  not
provide real counterexamples to IEM, be-
cause they do not aim at the target phe-
nomenon (cf. section 4).
(4) IEM is either a very trivial property of
judgments or beliefs or could be explained
in terms of immunity to misguided refer-
ence (cf. section 5).
In order to defend these four theses we in-
troduce  two  conceptual  distinctions  by  which
we hope to describe the target phenomenon in
greater detail. Some philosophers, such as Evans
(1982) and  Shoemaker (1968) consider IEM to
be  a  property  of  judgments,  whereas  others,
such  as  Coliva (2002)  and  Bermúdez (1998),
talk  about  some  phenomenal  aspects.  Let  us
summarise  these  two accounts  of  IEM as  fol-
lows:
First-person pronoun immunity (IEM-FP):
A speaker who uses the singular indexical ex-
pression “I” knows a thing to be  and conφ -
ducts a predication “a is ”. This judgment isφ
based on the rule  of  identification-freedom,  so
that it is clear that “I am ” is a judgment thatφ
does not  depend on any further identification
component.1
Phenomenological immunity (IEM-P): Im-
munity to error through misidentification is a
property of  phenomenal states  that character-
ises the constituents of first-person judgments.
These  identification-free  constituents  manifest
themselves  in  phenomenological  experiences
about oneself.2
1 In other words, a judgment is identification-free if to judge that “a is
” φ eo ipso is to judge that “I am ”. Shoemaker’s argument for idenφ -
tification-freedom (subject-use) can be summarized as  follows.  (1)
The utterance “a is ” gives rise to an error through misidentificaφ -
tion, if a speaker knows a thing to be  and mistakenly thinks thatφ
‘a’ refers to  (cf. φ Shoemaker 1968). (2) Not every subject-use, which
can give rise to knowledge about oneself, depends on identification,
because this would lead to an infinite regress (cf.  ibid.). (3) Since
there is no identification of an object with a thinker in subjective
first-person judgments, they are clearly incorrigible (relative to the
first-person pronoun (e.g., some proprioceptive judgments or “I feel
pain”;  Shoemaker 1968). (4) Since the use-as-subject does not de-
pend  on  identification,  an  error  through  misidentification  is  im-
possible.
2 This is a highly controversial metaphysical generalization of IEM, be-
cause it assumes that there are phenomenal constituents of IEM that
serve for IEM as a property of judgments. Lane (2012), for instance,
denies  that  there  are  any  unique  constituents  that  could  explain
mineness or mental ownership. Nonetheless, we suspect that the au-
thors who defend theories of phenomenological immunity, like Liang,
have  to  accept  this  generalization  in  one  or  another  way.  
François Recanati (2012) seems to defend a similar position. A sub-
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There  is  a  strong  inclination  that  the
above  philosophers  who  describe  IEM  as  a
property of judgments claim IEM to be some-
thing like a conceptual truth. But this would be
overhasty, because of the fact that it is not yet
clearly elaborated what a judgment with regard
to the property in question actually is. We turn
to this problem later. Liang seems to be a pro-
ponent of  IEM-P, which holds that  IEM is  a
property of phenomenal states:
My target is a form of mental immunity
that I call experiential immunity. Experi-
ential immunity concerns phenomenal ex-
periences. It is a form of relative immunity
that is, it is relative to first-personal ac― -
cess to phenomenal states, such as intro-
spection, somatosensation, proprioception,
etc. (Liang this collection, p. 8)
What distinguishes Liang’s account from others
is that he emphasises that IEM does not hold
necessarily. In an older paper he and Lane state
that  the  philosophical  orthodoxy  of  IEM has
never been empirically challenged. That is be-
cause the majority of philosophers hold IEM as
a  conceptual  truth,  which  has  nothing  to  do
with the empirically-tractable structure of real-
ity (cf. Lane & Liang 2011). Our commentary is
structured as follows. First, we summarize Li-
ang’s  most  interesting  claims  and  distinctions
(cf. section  2). In section  3 we claim that it is
impossible that the sense of experiential owner-
ship  can misrepresent  the  fact  of  experiential
ownership, and that phenomenal states are not
eligible bearers of IEM as a property. In section
4 our main claim is that Liang’s interpretation
ject experiences a state, for instance, through a proprioceptive mode,
whereas the subject is not explicitly represented. He calls this impli-
cit de se immunity to error through misidentification (IEM). This
mode of experience is immune to error through misidentification be-
cause  it  is  identification-free.  Then the subject  reflects  upon this
mode of experience, which means that she represents explicitly who
the subject is. This is the explicit de se. The explicit involvement of
a subject is constituted by the implicit involvement of the subject,
which is identification-free. Since the former, the constituent, is IEM,
it is also the latter. Recanati’s argumentation was the inspiration for
summarizing proponents of phenomenal (or perceptual) immunity, as
we  did  with  IEM-P.  The  question  arises  whether  some  systems
without any instantiated phenomenal properties could have beliefs
that have the property of IEM. Since we are skeptical about IEM-P
as a constituent of IEM-FP, as will be argued, nothing excludes this
possibility according to our account. 
of  some  empirical  studies  does  not  provide
counterexamples to IEM. Section 5 develops the
consequences of this claim and concludes with
some aspects concerning the way in which we
could talk  about IEM in a more deflationary
and less mysterious manner, such as in terms of
immunity to misguided reference (IMR) or mis-
predication. In section 6 we conclude with some
proposals for future research.
2 The sense of body ownership vs. the 
sense of experiential ownership
Before we discuss the self-as-subject in a more
detailed manner, we focus on Liang’s conceptual
refinements of the self-as-object. Liang proposes
three important distinctions that are very help-
ful for the debate on bodily self-consciousness.
The first marks out the fact of body ownership
and the sense of body ownership. The fact of
body ownership  has  nothing  to  do  with  phe-
nomenal experiences of one’s own body. It just
describes “[…] a biological fact about the ana-
tomical  structures  of  one’s  body”  (Liang this
collection, p. 2). In contrast, the sense of body
ownership describes the experiences of the fac-
tual aspect of body ownership. Hence, to exper-
ience something as belonging to one’s own body
is to experience a biological fact.  Then Liang
distinguishes  between  the  first-personal  sense
and the third-personal sense of body ownership.
We think that this is a very explanatorily fruit-
ful distinction. The first-personal sense of body
ownership  describes  some  pre-reflective  states
such as  walking  or  proprioceptive  states.  But
these states could be third-personal or reflective
as well if  there are experienced from the out-
side, for instance through mirror recognition of
one’s own body parts. 
The last distinction concerning the self-as-
object is between  the sense of body ownership
and the sense of self as physical body. The sense
of body ownership is the experience of various
body parts belonging to one’s own body, while
the sense  of  self  as  a  physical  body concerns
more ontological questions of the self. Here Li-
ang introduces the sense of self as physical body
as  the  sense  of  being  a  person  of  flesh  and
blood. 
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Let  us  concentrate  on  the  distinction
between  the first-personal sense and the  third-
personal sense of body ownership. For us it is a
rich conceptual tool that can help us refine the
classic Wittgensteinean distinction between self-
as-object  and self-as-subject.  We suggest  that
the notions of the first-personal sense of body
ownership and the sense of experiential owner-
ship are often used interchangeably. There are
closely related but of course distinct from each
other. Imagine a person who recognises that her
legs are crossed through the first-personal sense
of body ownership. She experiences her legs to
be her own crossed legs. But here the Wittgen-
stein question makes perfect sense. Is it really
she who is experiencing that very state? This
open question marks out the sense of experien-
tial ownership. We share Liang’s criticism that
the lack of a distinction between a sense of bod-
ily ownership and a sense of experiential owner-
ship could result in overinterpretation of some
empirical data. If this distinction makes sense—
as  we think it  does—then Liang’s  claim that
Damasio, Panksepp, and Northoff’s conceptions
of the core self do not target the sense of self as
experiential  ownership sufficiently is  plausible.
The  claims  fit  rather  with  the  first-personal
sense of body ownership. 
In order to target the sense of experiential
ownership, the Wittgenstein question could be
asked to the participants of some experiments.
Then  we  could,  according  to  Liang,  measure
and elaborate on not only  what  is experienced
but also on who is experiencing. Liang convinces
us that there is more to explain than just senses
of body ownership. If the sense of experiential
ownership marks out a specific phenomenal tar-
get  property,  then  much  has  to  be  done  in
philosophical and interdisciplinary empirical re-
search. If Liang is right—which we think he is—
and the target phenomenon of the sense of ex-
periential  ownership  is  empirically  tractable,
some further research would be very interesting
and illuminating.
3 IEM-P—A conceptual matter?
In order to discuss this appropriately we first
have to recall some of Liang’s conceptual refine-
ments.  One important  distinction we want to
discuss is the distinction between the fact of ex-
periential ownership and the sense of experien-
tial ownership, which mark out the factual and
the subjective aspect of experiential ownership.
The third-personal sense of experiential owner-
ship describes the factual aspect, which can be
observed from the outside via fMRI. Liang calls
it a biological fact that, when a subject under-
goes an experience, there is an objective fact of
experiential  ownership  that  is  constitutive  of
the sense of experiential  ownership. The first-
personal  sense  is  a  phenomenal  property  of
mental states, which means that it does not re-
quire further informational states to ensure that
the one  who is experiencing it  from the inside
sense  herself  experiencing  it,  which  would  be
the “for-me” aspect. This is the property which
concerns the aspect in which we and Liang are
interested  in:  the  self-as-subject.  In  order  to
evaluate the arguments of IEM, Liang uses the
conceptual refinement offered by  Pryor (1999),
namely the de re and which-object misidentific-
ation. The former has been challenged through
cases  of  somatoparaphrenia,  the  latter  by the
so-called  body-swap  illusion,  both  of  which
provide cases of misrepresentation. What hap-
pens in  cases  of  misrepresentation? For Liang
the  sense  of  experiential  ownership  misrepres-
ents the fact of experiential ownership. We ar-
gue that there are some aspects of the fact of
experiential ownership and the sense of experi-
ential  ownership that  are  not  that  clear.  Our
thesis is that the fact of experiential ownership
has nothing to do with IEM-P in the first place,
but is rather what some philosophers describe
as the conceptual truth of a subject having an
experience.  If  you  are  describing  the  specific
phenomenological richness of an instantiated ex-
perience, it is obviously true that it is an exper-
ience of a subject.3 Since subjects are the bear-
ers of experiences (as opposed to objects) it is
quite obvious that there is a fact that somebody
3 It is  important to mention that a subject can experience a state
“from the inside”, which she does not experience as her own. Experi-
enced  “from  the  inside”,  it  could  belong  to  someone  else  or  to
nobody (Lane 2012). But this fact, which we take to be an analytic
truth, is something ascribed “from the outside”. To say that some-
body has an experience, is just to say that the experience is instanti-
ated in a subject, regardless of which experience the subject under-
goes exactly. 
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has this experience. This can be illustrated in
Liang’s  own words:  “[w]hen a subject experi-
ences a phenomenal state,  there exists a fact
that he is the subject of that state” (Liang this
collection,  p.  6).  But this  is  just  analytically
true, since experiences are not free-floating oc-
currences—because they, as a matter of prin-
ciple,  have  a  subject  of  experience.  This  is
about  using  the  words  “somebody’s  experi-
ence” correctly and is rather a description from
the  outside.  It  tells  us  nothing  substantial
about  IEM-P.  Perry (1998,  pp.  96–97)  talks
about a similar phenomenon while recapitulat-
ing Locke’s idea of personal identity. He claims
that “[a]n instance of being aware of an experi-
ence, and the experience of which one is aware
is known, necessarily belong to the same per-
son […]”. To say something substantial it would
be important for the content of  the phenom-
enal  experience of  a specific  state to  concern
the subject itself. But the content, experienced
“from the inside”, is of course different from an
analytical  truth,  because  phenomenal  states
have  nothing  to  do  with  the  right  usage  of
words. The content of the phenomenal experi-
ence is what Liang calls the sense of experien-
tial  ownership,  experienced  from  the  inside.
Granted that these two conceptualizations are
correct,  it  is  impossible  that  a  phenomenal
state like the experiential ownership represen-
ted from the inside can misrepresent something
that  is  rather  a  conceptual  ascription  or  de-
scription from the outside. They are completely
different categories. To understand this we can
think  of  a  patient  suffering  from dissociative
identity disorder (DID), who has many differ-
ent  personalities.  What  would  be  the  fact  of
experiential  ownership  here?  To  answer  this
question  a very specific  and rigorous  concep-
tion of personal identity is needed, which can-
not be discussed here. 
Let us summarise the argument:
Sense of experiential ownership cannot misrep-
resent fact of experiential ownership
(1) The fact of experiential ownership is to de-
scribe (as we see it), as a matter of logical ne-
cessity, that an experience is instantiated in a
subject, that is (according to Liang), if a sub-
ject  undergoes  an  experience  in  the  actual
world, a matter of fact.
(2) The sense of experiential ownership concerns
the content of a phenomenal experience, which
can either be experienced as owned by a subject
or by nobody. 
(3)  Phenomenal  experiences  do  not  represent
facts or states of affairs and even less analytic
truths.
(4) The sense of experiential ownership cannot
represent the fact of experiential ownership. 
(5)  A representation necessarily  goes  together
with the possibility of a misrepresentation.
(C) The sense of experiential ownership cannot
misrepresent the fact of experiential ownership.
Does it generally make sense to talk about
IEM-P as a property of phenomenal states? The
remaining story about IEM-P could be that it
serves as the basis for judgments that usher in
beliefs  (see  section  4).  The  immunity  would
then hold just through the structure of experi-
ence itself. But does it? 
We claim that there no error through misid-
entification  is  possible,  because  of  the  lack  of
judgments and cognitive elaboration at the phe-
nomenal  level.  An  identity  judgment  requires
identifying two conceptually-represented ingredi-
ents. Phenomenal states can be accompanied by
conceptual  ingredients,  but  they  are  not  basic
properties  of  phenomenal  states  themselves.4
Thus, they are distinct from one another. Hence
we could say that phenomenal states are neither
eligible for such a kind of error in general nor for
a de re  or which-object misidentification in par-
ticular. The intelligibility of IEM-P is very doubt-
able. Let us again summarise the argument:
Ineligibility of IEM-P
(1) To talk about identification is to talk about
judgments and inferences that can be identified
with one another,  which means that they are
judged to be identical.
4 Proponents of  Cognitive Phenomenology would probably deny this
claim. We stick with Carruthers & Veillet (2011), who says that cog-
nitive thoughts could causally initiate some phenomenal experiences.
The  stronger  claim,  that  thoughts  constitute  phenomenal  experi-
ences,  lacks  substantial  argument.  Hence we stick to the position
that phenomenal states and thought contents could occur in isolation
from each other. 
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(2)  To  talk  about  misidentification  is  to  talk
about some defective judgments. 
(3) Phenomenal states have nothing to do with
judgments and inferences in the first place. 
(C) Phenomenal states lack the basic properties
to be defective.
The ineligibility  of  phenomenal  states  of
course  satisfies  the  rule  of  identification-free-
dom. But since phenomenal states  are always
identification-free, the claim that they are im-
mune to error through misidentification is mis-
leading. Why is that? Remember that the con-
tent  of  phenomenal  experience  could  occur
without being owned by somebody (Lane 2012).
Nevertheless, an experience is instantiated in a
subject, which is just a matter of principle or
the factual aspect. If the content of a phenom-
enal experience just occurs, without an experi-
ence of mineness, then the rule of identification-
freedom tells us nothing substantial, because of
the lack of any committed judgment. An inter-
esting question, of course, is whether there are
any judgments that are identification-free.
We would recommend talking about IEM
as a property of judgments or beliefs (IEM-FP)
instead  of  talking  about  phenomenal  states.
Nevertheless, there are also some problems with
IEM-FP that we will present and discuss in sec-
tion 4. Let us now have a closer look at the two
alleged counterexamples that Liang proposes.
4 Two counterexamples to IEM-FP?
IEM is generally considered to be a property
of judgments concerning the first-person per-
spective  and  respectively  involving  the  first-
person pronoun. A major problem in the cur-
rent discussion about IEM is that no solid ac-
count of what judgments are is given. In con-
trast to philosophers that are concerned with
beliefs, who usually give a brief declaration of
what they take beliefs  to  be (e.g.,  relations,
sentence  operations  etc.),  philosophers  in-
volved  in  the  IEM  discussion  seem  to  take
judgments  to  be  already  widely  understood.
Since the initial paper written by  Shoemaker
(1968) focuses on the identification-freedom of
judgments,  we  think  that  what  philosophers
usually talk about using the term “judgment”
is inference or reasoning.5
So we take judgments to consist of propos-
itional reasoning. Let us have a look at some ex-
amples:
Judgment A:
(1) John is a fish. (Fa)
(2) Fish can swim. (∀x)(Fx→Gx)
(C) John can swim. (Ga) 
Judgment B:
(1) John is a fish. (Fa)
(2) John is Jim’s best friend. (a=b)
(C) Jim’s best friend is a fish. (Fb)
Though usually the conclusion of these in-
ferences is  what is  referred to using the term
“judgment”, we do not think that philosophers
generally tend to take judgments as being ad-
equately analysed as propositional attitudes (as
relations between persons and propositions like
5 The reason for this is the following: if you talk about “identifica-
tion-components”, there must be something that is composed of
at least one identification-component, and probably of something
else as well. The identification component (as described by cur-
rent  philosophers—a=b)  is  either  a  sentence  or  a  proposition,
either expressing an identification or representing it.  (This  dis-
tinction is just made to satisfy Platonists and nominalists.) What
is it  that is  composed of identification- and other components?
We think, according to the usual use of language of philosophers
debating IEM (She sees a bleeding hand in the mirror and thus
judges “I am bleeding”), that the most probable answer is that
they  are  part  of  an  inference.  Whenever  you  say  that  one
“judges” p, you want to express not only that she believes p, but
also that she has come to this belief through inference. We take
this to be an adequate interpretation of the term “judgment” as
used in Shoemaker, Pryor, Barz, and probably Liang as well. It is
probably  inadequate  for  every instance of  “judgment” in philo-
sophy, because our interpretation suggests that there are (hidden
or opaque) processes that are important for calling something a
judgment. Even though proponents of accounts that are Rylean
(Ryle 2009), for example, would strongly disagree (because they
wouldn’t accept that there are hidden processes that we want to
talk about using the term “judgment”), we think that there is in
fact  an  ontological  or  categorical  difference  between  judgment
and beliefs: either judgments are processes and beliefs are states,
or judgments are a subclass of beliefs, but a subclass of beliefs
that one has come to through a process of inference (which is not
necessarily the case with beliefs—just imagine someone manipu-
lating  your  brain  such  that  you  gain  new  beliefs).  So,  unlike
Ryle, we would say that as long as we are talking about human
beings,  judgments  are  certainly  something  that  happen  in  the
hidden depths of the human brain. And we can represent them—
for  our  purposes—as  structured  like  logical  inferences.  Please
note that this is just an additional remark concerning our posit-
ive account of judgments that a lot of papers seem to lack. Our
central  argumentation does  not rely on this specific ontological
reading of “judgment” and “belief”.
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“Jim believes that it is raining”). We take the
whole inference to be what is referred to with
the term “judgment”, and the conclusion to be
what  is  referred  to  using  the  term  “belief”.6
Judgments A and B are analogous in the follow-
ing  sense:  they  are  both  judgments  involving
two premises and their logically necessary con-
clusions. But they differ in a particular aspect
that  is  of  the  highest  importance  concerning
IEM:  only  judgment  B involves  an  identifica-
tion, whereas judgment A is identification-free.
So the first thing we can say is that IEM follow-
ing from identification-freedom is not an exclus-
ive  property  of  judgments  involving  the  first-
person pronoun—there are numerous judgments
that do not contain any identification-compon-
ents. This is our first reason for thinking that
IEM may hold, but is not a remarkable or signi-
ficant  property  exclusively  reserved  for  judg-
ments involving the first-person pronoun. 
What Shoemaker wants to make clear is
that  there  are  certain  judgments  that  cannot
take the logical form of judgment B and that
these  judgments  involve  the  first-person  pro-
noun, in the sense of  Wittgenstein’s  “subject-
use”.  Let  us  take  a  look  at  what  Shoemaker
means  by  giving  examples  for  the  object-use
and the subject-use:
Object-use:
(1) The person in the mirror is looking tired.
(Fa)
(2) I am the person in the mirror. (a=b)
(C) I am looking tired. (Fb)
As you can see,  there are judgments in-
volving  the  first-person  pronoun that  also  in-
volve an identification-component—at least that
is what Shoemaker (1968) thinks. But when he
claims that  there  are  judgments  that  are im-
mune to error through misidentification, he does
not claim that they are immune to  any error,
and nor does he claim that the identity relation
holds  with  metaphysical  necessity—he  just
6 Note that we in fact think that beliefs are brain states and judg-
ments (if they are inferences) are cognitive processes—but they do
not need to be brain states and cognitive processes. Depending on
which understanding of propositions you prefer (e.g., the meaning of
sentences or informational  packs),  any machine that is  capable of
some kind of reasoning can judge and have beliefs.
claims that whenever one judges and this judg-
ment  involves  certain  kind  of  predicates  (or
properties)  it  is  automatically  identification-
free. One of those predicates (or properties) is
being  in  pain.  Let’s  have  a  look  at  how the
judgment would work with this special predic-
ate that we may call P*.
Subject-use:
(1)  There  is  something  that  is  in  pain.  (∃x)
(P*x)
(2) P* is always a property of the person recog-
nizing it. (P*gen)
(C) I am in pain (P*a)
In fact this formal representation of such a
judgment is even weaker than what Shoemaker
may have had in mind, thus the strong reading
of his idea of judgments that are IEM because
of their identification freedom would be:
(1)  There  is  something  that  is  in  pain.  (∃x)
(P*x)
(C) I am in pain. (P*a)
This  reading  gets  closer  to  Shoemaker’s
idea,  because  he  would  not  agree  that  judg-
ments explicitly involve a generalization such as
(2). We undertook this brief exercise first of all
to put pressure on the following point: although
philosophers of different generations have been
talking about IEM for decades, they usually fail
to give an  explicit account of what judgments
are  and  how  they  work.7 This  exercise  was
meant to fill this theoretical gap for the purpose
of the current discussion. So whenever someone
utters “John is a fisherman”, we take this sen-
tence to express a propositional attitude—a be-
lief. But when we believe that he judges “John
is  a  fisherman”,  we  also  take  that  person  to
have made an inference, simply because that is
what we want to say when we ascribe a judg-
ment to him. Shoemaker’s claim that judgments
like “I am in pain” are immune to error through
misidentification does not mean that there are
hidden structures,  neither  of  the sentence  ex-
7 This means that there are no papers about IEM that give a positive
account of judgments, e.g.,  Shoemaker (1968),  Evans (1982),  Barz
(2010).
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pressing the judgment nor of the propositional
attitude  expressed  by  the  sentence  “I  am  in
pain”; it means that no identification-compon-
ent was involved in the inference that has been
made.
The second reason for undertaking this ex-
ercise is that we want to have a look at whether
Liang’s counterexamples (especially the somato-
paraphrenia example) are real counterexamples.
We do not think that the two examples Liang
gives are in any way counterexamples to IEM—
though they are philosophically very interesting,
especially concerning theories of self-conscious-
ness. Liang claims that the two counterexamples
falsify  the  Immunity  Principle,  but  we  claim
that they do not meet the conditions that have
to be met to falsify this theory. So we must first
see what Liang takes to falsify the IEM theory
and then settle on a criterion for how the IEM
theory could be falsified.
Liang thinks that the following would suf-
fice for IEM to hold:
(1) for every phenomenal state there must
be a subject who experiences it; (2) every
phenomenal state is in principle available
to first-personal access (Shoemaker 1996);
(3) every phenomenal state is experienced
by the one who has first-personal access to
that state. The crucial point is that (1)–
(3) do not imply that (4) every phenom-
enal state is, from the first-person point of
view,  represented  as  experienced  by  the
one who has first-personal access to that
state. (Liang this collection, p. 8)
Liang  also  considers  his  two  counterexamples
(the somatoparaphrenia patient and the body-
swap illusion) to be counterexamples to (4), so
the  IEM-principle  does  not  hold.  In  fact  we
agree with Liang that at least one of these ex-
amples is  a counterexample to (4) but we do
not agree that (4) is necessary for IEM to hold.
So let us first have a look at how a falsification
of  the  IEM-theory  would  have  to  look.  The
IEM-theory  comes  in  the  form of  a  material
conditional:  if a person judges “I am ”,φ  then
she cannot be wrong because of a misidentifica-
tion. The truth conditions for a material condi-
tional are clear: the conditional is wrong if and
only  if  the  antecedent  is  true  and  the  con-
sequent is wrong. This brings us to the defini-
tion of a theoretical falsification of IEM:
Falsification of IEM =Df : 1. The IEM-the-
ory would be falsified if and only if a per-
son judges “I am ” and is wrong in herφ
judgment  because  of  a  misidentification.
Or,  more  precisely:  2. The  IEM-theory
would be falsified if and only if there is an
example of a person that believes “I am
” and comes to this belief through inferφ -
ence (the judgment) that involves an iden-
tification  component  and  this  identifica-
tion is wrong.
Thus,  speaking  more  formally,  a  judgment  of
the  following  two  forms  must  be  present  (cf.
Pryor 1999):
wh-judgment8
(1) (∃x)(Fx) (predication to a variable)
(2) I am x (identification, x=a)
(C) I am F (predication to a constant, depend-
ing on the identification), (Fa)
or
de re judgment9
(1) A particular thing (de re) is F (Fa)
(2) I am that particular thing (a=b)
(C) I am F (Fb)
We pick these two different structures to
emphasise that Shoemaker did not exclusively
talk about de re  “attitudes”  but also  about
“existential  quantification”,  though  he  did
not  do  so  explicitly. Note  that  besides  the
presence of belief states such as (c) it is ne-
cessary  for  the  falsification  of  IEM-theory
that this conclusion is only wrong because (2)
is wrong.
8 A wh-judgment involving an identification starts with existential quantific-
ation over a variable. You know that there is something that has a partic-
ular property and then you identify that something with, e.g., yourself.
9 A de re  judgment involving an identification starts with a predica-
tion to a particular  thing—a constant.  So  you know a  particular
thing to have a particular property and then you find that thing to
be identical with, e.g., yourself.
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The  crucial  question  concerning  Liang’s
counterexamples  is:  do  they  meet  this  condi-
tion? Consider the first example. It is—as Liang
sees it according to Pryor—an example of a de
re misidentification. De re misidentifications oc-
cur,  for  example,  when there  are  two objects
equally eligible for exemplifying the property in
question. To show that Liang’s first example is
a  counterexample  to  IEM one would  have  to
prove, first, that the structure of a de re judg-
ment as stated above holds, and second that the
judgment  is  only  wrong  because  the  second
premise is not true. Recall the first experiment:
a  patient  suffering  from  somatoparaphrenia,
FB, is touched on her hand and asked whether
she feels her hand being touched. She answers
“No”. When she is asked whether she feels her
niece’s hand being touched, she gives a positive
answer (FB believes that her hand is in fact her
niece’s hand, and has been placed on her body).
But  since  she  does  not  judge  “I  am  being
touched on my hand”, the necessary conditions
for falsifying the IEM-theory are not met. The
material conditional could only be proved wrong
if the antecedent (a person judging that she has
a certain property) is true, but in this case it is
not true. The conditions would have been met if
she had answered “I feel being touched on my
hand”,  even  though  she  was  not,  and  even
though the only reason why she was wrong was
because  she  misidentified  her  own  sensations
with someone else’s. But she does not commit
the error of judging “I am being touched” in the
first place, so the IEM-theory is not falsified. It
is crucial here to understand that falsification of
IEM does not depend on what exactly she said,
but whether she judged that she had a certain
property.  Unfortunately  wrongly  judging  that
one is not touched, though one is touched, does
not get close to a falsification of IEM, by defini-
tion of the truth conditions of material condi-
tionals.
Now let us have a look at Liang’s second
counterexample:  the  body-swap  illusion.  This,
according to Liang and Pryor, is an example of
a  wh-misidentification  that  happens  when
someone simply knows a property to be there
(e.g., a smell) and falsely ascribes this property
to a particular object. In this setup, the parti-
cipants judge that they are shaking hands with
themselves.  This  example gets  much closer  to
the claim of IEM, because they in fact judge,
and  judge  falsely,  that  they  experience  some-
thing, and there  is another person who really
seems to have that experience. So it seems that
one of the following inferences is made:
(1) A particular person is shaking hands with
myself. (Fa)
(2) I am that person. (a=b)
(C) I am shaking hands with myself. (Fb)
or
(1)  There is  something that is  shaking hands
with myself. (∃x)(Fx)
(2) I am that something. (x=a)
(C) I am shaking hands with myself. (Fa)
If these judgments occurred it is obvious
that they are false because the second premise
is false—thus an error through misidentification
was made. But did the participants really com-
mit such an error? Recall that the IEM thesis
would be falsified if a person believed a certain
proposition but was mistaken because and only
because she misidentified herself with someone
else.  Did  the  participants  really  believe  that
they were shaking hands with themselves? We
assume  that  they  most  certainly  did  not.  Of
course  they  remarked  that  they  were  shaking
hands  with  themselves,  but  we  take  them to
speak merely metaphorically and not literally. If
one  wanted  to  be  sure,  the  same  experiment
would have to be made, asking the participants
whether they believed that they were shaking
hand with themselves (not if it felt as if they
were).  Even  if  they  believed  that  they  were
shaking  hands  with  themselves,  the  judgment
would probably not have the form stated above,
because they did not have the experience of the
other participant—only if they had an experi-
ence that that very (exactly the same) experi-
ence depended upon another person, and only if
they accidently identified themselves with that
person—only in that case would the IEM-theory
be falsified. But the participants did not have
the experience of the other person wearing the
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camera. They were having their very own exper-
ience—caused by the informational flow starting
with the display (monitoring not the perspect-
ive of the person wearing the camera, but the
camera’s  perspective)  and  their  own  lenses,
their  own  retina,  and  so  on.  The  experience
they ascribed to themselves was not the experi-
ence of  another person or  agent,  it  was their
own  experience.  They  were  only  wrong  in
judging  that  they  were  shaking  hands  with
themselves because they in fact did not shake
hands with themselves. This is not a misidenti-
fication but simply a mispredication. This prob-
lem will be elaborated in section 5.
So why does  Liang think that  these  ex-
amples  are  counterexamples  to  IEM? Because
he takes (4) to be crucial for IEM to hold. The
differences between what Shoemaker and Evans
take to be the theory of IEM and what Liang
takes it to be are the following:
Shoemaker/Evans:  If  a  person  believes
that she has certain properties, she cannot be
mistaken in having them by misidentifying her-
self  (or  her  phenomenal  states)  with someone
else or someone else’s states. In this conditional,
the antecedent implies a person to believe some-
thing  about  herself  or,  speaking  in  Liang’s
terms, a person to represent herself as having a
so-and-so  experience.  But  Liang’s  conditional
looks quite different:
Liang:  “(4)  every  phenomenal  state  is,
from the first-person point of view, represented
as experienced  by  the  one  who  has  first-per-
sonal access to that state.” (Liang this collec-
tion, p. 8)
So what used to be the antecedent in the
original theory becomes the consequent in Li-
ang’s theory—thus Liang is right that (4) does
not hold and that  the somatoparaphrenia pa-
tient  and  her  reports  are  counterexamples  to
(4), but he is not right in taking this fact to
falsify the IEM-theory. 
5 Why does IEM-FP hold?
There seems to be an immunity relative to the
first-person pronoun, which at least guarantees
that  you  cannot  have  a  belief  like  “I  believe
that  I  am  in  pain”  and  accidentally  take
someone else  to  have  that  belief.  It  probably
also guarantees that in this case you cannot be
wrong  about  who  is  in  pain.  We  think  that
there are a few good theoretical candidates for
explaining this kind of immunity. These candid-
ates are:
1. Irrelevance of misidentification
2. Immunity to misguided reference
3. Reference magnetism
Since reference magnetism10 is a highly contro-
versial, metaphysical notion and it would take
too much time to elaborate this view correctly
(which would certainly include a refreshment of
Lewis’ philosophy of reference), we will focus on
the first two for the sake of this commentary.
1. Irrelevance of misidentification:
If you take judgments about yourself to be
a)  always  starting  with de  re  beliefs  and  b)
single-predicative in  form, it  seems impossible
to construe misidentification as being relevant
to the truth-value of a sentence or proposition.
This point has been made by Barz (2010). Barz
takes  the  current  discussion  to  assume  that
there are two fundamentally different kinds of
errors that can occur: an error through misiden-
tification and an error through mispredication.
It should be clear what an error through mis-
predication is supposed to be: an error through
mispredication  occurrs  when  a  person’s  judg-
ment is wrong and is only wrong because the
predicate she thinks applies to a particular ob-
ject in fact does not apply to that object. Barz’
definition of an error through misidentification
(in general) is the following: 
General  error  through  misidentification
(EM-G): A person S (i)  believes (de re) of a
certain  thing  that  it  is  F,  (ii) believes  that
10 A short explanation: reference magnetism is a theory that claims
that  there  are  metaphysically  distinguished objects  of  reference
in the world (no matter whether they are abstract or concrete)
that function as magnets for certain expressions. This could, for
example, hold for natural kinds and existential quantification. In
the  case  of  existential  quantification,  some  philosophers,  like
Theodore Sider (2009), claim that there is no possibility of talk-
ing about  existence without talking about the very same thing
that everybody talks about—as long as there is no explicit or im-
plicit  quantifier  restriction.  Reference  Magnetism  plays  an  im-
portant role in the debate about quantifier variance and verbal
debates.
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thing  to  be  identical  with  a,  and  (iii)  thus
judges that  a is  F. But (iv)  a is not identical
with the thing S believes to be F.
According to Barz this kind of error can-
not  happen  at  all,  so  the  proponents  of  the
IEM-theory are right—but in fact IEM is not
an exclusive property of judgments concerning
the  first-person  or  involving  the  first-person
pronoun, and is instead a property of any judg-
ment. His argumentation can be summarised in
one sentence: since there are examples of judg-
ments involving misidentification that are nev-
ertheless true, and since there cannot be judg-
ments  involving  mispredication  that  are  true,
there are no errors through misidentification. A
judgment is right or wrong solely depending on
whether the predicate applies to the object.
Imagine  the  following  situation  that  is
usually  used  to  distinguish  between  notional
and referential use of singular terms: Peter is a
detective,  investigating  the  case  of  Smith’s
murder.  Participating  in  the  judicial  proceed-
ings, a man, accused of having murdered Smith,
behaves so strangely that Peter, the detective,
judges: Smith’s murderer is a maniac. He is us-
ing the term “Smith’s murderer” to refer to the
person  that  is  accused  of  having  murdered
Smith, and according to most theories of refer-
ence he does in fact refer to that person with
that term. But what if that person is not the
one who murdered  Smith,  but  is  nevertheless
still a maniac? Thus a misidentification has oc-
curred, but no error. On the other hand, if the
person were Smith’s murderer but not a maniac
(maybe his weird behaviour was the result  of
pharmaceutical  treatment)—Peter’s  judgment
would be wrong.
The same goes for the traditional wrestler
example. Imagine that wrestler A and wrestler B
are in a close wrestling fight and wrestler A does
not misidentify her arm with the arm of wrestler
B but still, for some strange reason—maybe there
are blood smears caused by a bleeding bird that
flew over the two wrestlers—comes to judge “My
arm is bleeding” (although wrestler B’s arm is ac-
tually bleeding). She would be wrong, but her er-
ror would not be one of misidentification but of
mispredication. Thus, as Barz believes, there are
no errors through misidentification, because the
only thing that necessarily suffices for the falsity
of a judgment is mispredication.
As one can guess, Barz’ theory does not
completely  fit  with  our  theory  of  judgments.
While we take judgments to be processes of in-
ference,  thus  involving  several  propositions,
Barz seems to take judgments to be relations to
single,  structured  propositions.  We  can  agree
with Barz if he can explain how the identifica-
tion component in the judgment—which would,
in our terms, be one of the premises used during
the inference—is in fact a kind of predication.
2. Immunity to misguided reference:
Howell (2007)  wants  to  distinguish
between two kinds of immunity: immunity to er-
ror through misidentification and immunity to
misguided reference:
IEM is often confused with what I call Im-
munity  to  Misguided Reference  (IMR).  A
judgment that x is F has IMR if it is im-
possible for someone to make that judgment
while being mistaken about the reference of
x. All I-judgments have IMR, while not all
I-judgments are IEM. (Howell 2007, p. 584)
To say that there is something like immunity to
misguided reference (IMR) does not mean that
one can never be wrong about the reference of
any term one uses. It just means that whenever
you want to refer to yourself using the term “I”
you cannot fail to do so. 
We  think  that  a  majority  of  the  pro-
ponents of IEM are in fact proponents of IMR.
And because IEM is thought to be an immunity
relative  to the first-person pronoun (what we
have termed IEM-FP),  it  makes  sense  to  say
that this immunity is in fact an immunity of re-
ferring acts in general and not of judgments ex-
clusively. Talking about IMR can be helpful in
two ways: first, it can be helpful in stressing the
fact that IEM is not a theory about the self or
about subjectivity but  simply a theory about
linguistic rules and reference. Thus IEM-FP is a
trivial property that can be explained by the se-
mantic rules of usage of the word “I”.
Second,  it  can  be  helpful  for  explaining
our intuitions in complicated cases of self-refer-
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ence and by determining the objects of beliefs.
Think of the two wrestlers again. When one of
the wrestlers states “I am bleeding” or “My arm
is bleeding”, she is wrong, but it seems as if she
is not necessarily wrong because of a misidenti-
fication. Let’s have a look:
(1) Wrestler A correctly describes her belief, in-
tending to refer to herself using the first-person
pronoun.
(2) One cannot fail to refer to oneself when us-
ing the first-person pronoun. (IMR-rule)
(3) Wrestler A has a belief about herself (gran-
ted by accepting 1 and 2).
So  far  the  argument is  trivial—stating  that
Wrestler  A has a belief  about herself  just  means
that she has  any kind of belief. It does not show
that Wrestler A has a de re  belief about herself.
This comes from the second part of the argument:
(4) A de re belief is a belief that holds if the be-
liever is in a non-conceptual, contextual relation
to the object the belief is about.11 
(5) One is always in a non-conceptual, contex-
tual relation to oneself.12
(C) Wrestler A has a de re belief about herself
(granted by accepting 3, 4 and 5).
Opponents of the IEM-theory would have to
state that wrestler A has no de re belief about her-
self, because the object her belief is really about is
not herself, but wrestler B, misidentified with her-
self (thus creating a de dicto belief about herself
and a de re  belief about wrestler B). But by ac-
cepting IMR and certain accounts of de re  atti-
tudes we can see that wrestler A’s attitude is a
possible candidate for a de re belief about herself.
Thus the only reason why she would be wrong is—
as we have seen above—mispredication.
6 Concluding remarks
The question with which we began was how the
sense of experiential ownership is related to the
well-known property of IEM, and whether, if it
11 This is to accept a de re/de dicto distinction that is compatible with
non-propositional attitudes.
12 This does not mean that one is always only and exclusively in a non-
conceptual relation to oneself. Of course one can have de dicto beliefs
about oneself.
is,  the  proposed  counterexamples  are  cogent.
First of all we argued that it is impossible to
talk about the sense of experiential ownership
misrepresenting the fact of experiential owner-
ship, since the latter is a conceptual ascription
from the outside that has nothing to do with
phenomenal  states  that  are  experienced  from
the inside (cf. thesis 1). Second, IEM-P is an in-
coherent notion, because phenomenal states lack
the basic properties that are possessed by judg-
ments and inferences, namely to be defective—
which suffices for a misidentification. Since they
lack these properties,  the claim that phenom-
enal states are immune to error through misid-
entification is misleading (cf.  thesis  2).  Third,
we argued that the alleged counterexamples to
IEM are just counterexamples of Liang’s fourth
premise. But premise four is not necessary for
IEM to hold. In any case, the counterexamples
do not seriously challenge IEM, because the ne-
cessary conditions for a falsification are not met
(cf. thesis  3). The last section addressed some
aspects concerning how to talk about IEM con-
vincingly in future philosophical research. Our
suggestion is somehow deflationary, since it  is
not necessary, but very likely that the more in-
teresting properties for talking about are mis-
predication and IMR (cf. thesis 4). 
We are looking forward to the time when
philosophical as well as empirical interdisciplin-
ary research concerning the mind focuses on Li-
ang’s commitments on self-consciousness, most
interestingly the sense of experiential ownership.
We think  that  this  explanandum has  not  yet
been enriched with empirical data. Here Liang
perhaps provides a good starting point for fu-
ture research. In order to provide fruitful data,
we think that to ask the Wittgenstein question,
as Liang proposes, is a promising idea. But non-
etheless the question has to be subdivided in or-
der to provide a fruitful questionnaire. Here are
some proposals  that  are,  of  course,  provisory,
which could be more fine-grained, depending on
the experiment:
On a scale from 1 to 10, how much do you
feel  the  experience  as  being  owned  by  you?
Have you felt parts of your body as detached
from yourself? If yes, how much were you able
to control the belongingness of this body-experi-
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ence? Have you felt some experiences belonging
to another subject,  not being owned by your-
self?
Here  are  some  further  theoretical  ques-
tions: How is the sense of experiential ownership
connected to beliefs? Could it serve to justify
some beliefs? How is the sense of experiential
ownership  generally  related  to  self-knowledge?
We are looking forward to a fruitful discussion
in philosophy of mind and in cognitive sciences
with regard to the elaborated topics.
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